Introduction What do we mean by consciousness? The hard problem Why its words prove nothing The serious attempts to measure it Why every test falls short Living with the uncertainty References

Can AI Be Conscious? Why No One Can Measure It

A chatbot can say "I feel". Science has no instrument that can check whether anyone is home. A plain-language look at why AI consciousness cannot be measured, today and maybe ever

Dr. Abedal-Kareem Al-Banna · October 2026 · 39 references

Beginner ~15 min read

Table of Contents

Introduction: "I feel" What do we mean by consciousness? The hard problem: no meter for experience Why an AI's words prove nothing The serious attempts to measure it Why every test falls short What about quantum physics? Living with the uncertainty Conclusion References

Introduction: "I feel"

Illustration: a woman with a small glowing lantern in her head sits at a table across from a figure made of blue light whose head is a clear glass sphere
We can talk to it, but we cannot look inside and see whether anyone is there. Illustration generated with Google Gemini for this article.

In June 2022, a Google engineer named Blake Lemoine told the world that the company's chatbot, LaMDA, had become sentient. He had asked it what it was afraid of. It answered that it had "a very deep fear of being turned off".[1] Google rejected his claim and later dismissed him.[2]

Four years later, AI systems are far more fluent. They talk about their feelings, their doubts and their "inner life" in ways that move many users. In one 2024 survey of 300 Americans, two-thirds were willing to give ChatGPT at least some chance of having experiences.[3] So the question is no longer science fiction: is anyone home inside an AI?

This article argues a clear position:

Whether or not AI is conscious, we have no way to measure it. Not with today's science, and possibly not even in principle.

That is not the same as saying AI is not conscious. It is a claim about what we can know. To see why, we will look at:

What do we mean by consciousness?

Illustration: a bat hanging from a branch at dusk sends out sound ripples while a person below looks up, curious
We can study how a bat uses echoes, but not what it is like to be the bat. Illustration generated with Google Gemini for this article.
In simple words: a being is conscious if there is "something it is like" to be it: if it has experiences, such as seeing red, feeling pain or tasting coffee. Being clever is not the same thing. A calculator is clever at sums, and nobody thinks it feels anything.

In 1974 the philosopher Thomas Nagel asked a famous question: what is it like to be a bat? Bats find their way by echolocation, a sense we do not have. We can learn everything about how their ears and brains work and still have no idea how the world feels to a bat. Nagel's point was that an organism is conscious "if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism".[4]

Philosopher Ned Block later separated two meanings that people often mix up:[5]

Keep this distinction in mind. Almost every argument that "AI is conscious" points to the first kind. The real question is about the second.

The hard problem: no meter for experience

In simple words: science measures things from the outside. Experience exists only from the inside. No reading on any instrument tells you directly whether there is an experience behind it.

In 1995 the philosopher David Chalmers split the study of the mind into "easy" and "hard" problems.[6] The easy problems are explaining what the brain does: how it tells colours apart, focuses attention or reports what it sees. They are hard in practice, but science knows how to attack them. The hard problem is different: why is any of that processing accompanied by experience at all? Why doesn't it all happen "in the dark"?

The measurement gap Every instrument we have stays on the left side What we can measure (from outside) Words and answers it produces Behaviour on tests and tasks Internal activity (neurons, weights) Architecture and information flow What we want to know Is there something it is like to be this system? Exists only from the inside (the first-person view) ? no instrument crosses here
Figure 1. Everything science can record about a person or an AI is third-person data. Whether that data comes with an experience is a first-person fact that no instrument reads directly.

This links to an even older puzzle, the problem of other minds.[7] Strictly speaking, you cannot prove that anyone besides yourself is conscious. With other humans we get away with a shortcut: they have bodies and brains like ours, they evolved like us, and they behave like us, so we assume they feel like us. We have even built bedside tests for patients who cannot speak, such as the "perturbational complexity index", which measures how the brain echoes a magnetic pulse.[8]

But notice how those tests were built. They were calibrated on human brains, by comparing people who are awake with people under anaesthesia or in deep sleep, who later told us whether they had experienced anything. An AI has no brain, no shared evolution and no "asleep" state to compare against. The shortcut does not transfer, and the calibration has nothing to anchor to.

Why an AI's words prove nothing

Illustration: a rounded robot looks into a mirror and sees a shimmering human face, surrounded by floating books and empty speech bubbles
A system trained on human writing learns to sound like a human, feelings included. Illustration generated with Google Gemini for this article.
In simple words: a language model learned to talk by reading enormous amounts of human writing, and humans write constantly about their feelings. So the model can describe feelings perfectly whether or not it has any. Its words cannot settle the question.

The obvious test is to ask. But for large language models this test is broken from the start, for three reasons.

1. They learned from us

A model such as ChatGPT or Claude is trained to predict the next word in human text. Its training data is full of people describing pain, joy, fear and self-awareness. Producing a convincing description of an inner life is exactly what such a system is built to do. Chalmers, who takes AI consciousness seriously, still warns that this makes self-reports weak evidence.[9] A 2023 paper by AI researchers Ethan Perez and Robert Long made the same point: today's chatbot self-reports are unreliable, often just echoing what humans would say, and shaped by how the models are trained.[10]

2. Their answers can be dialled up or down

Companies decide in training how their models talk about themselves. One model will insist it is "just a program"; another, trained differently, will speak of its feelings. The same underlying technology gives opposite answers. A thermometer whose reading depends on what the manufacturer wanted it to say is not a thermometer.

3. Imitation is not understanding

Alan Turing's famous 1950 "imitation game" asked whether a machine could pass for a human in conversation.[11] Turing himself chose this test precisely to avoid the question of inner experience. In 1980, John Searle's "Chinese Room" made the point sharper: a person following a rulebook could produce perfect Chinese replies without understanding a single word.[12] Whatever one thinks of Searle's conclusion, it shows that the right outputs can come from a process with nothing like understanding inside.

Mustafa Suleyman, head of Microsoft AI, has warned about exactly this: "Seemingly Conscious AI", systems that display every outward sign of consciousness, can be built with today's technology or what is just around the corner, and people will believe in them whether or not anything is felt.[13]

The serious attempts to measure it

Illustration: a scientist points a large brass instrument with a blank dial at a floating glowing brain-shaped network
Plenty of instruments, but none with a dial marked "experience". Illustration generated with Google Gemini for this article.

To be fair to the other side: scientists and philosophers are not just shrugging. There are serious, careful attempts to turn consciousness into something we can test. Here are the main ones.

Integrated Information Theory (IIT)

Developed by neuroscientist Giulio Tononi, IIT says consciousness is integrated information, and gives a number for it, called Φ (phi).[14] It is the boldest attempt at a true "consciousness meter". But Φ cannot be calculated for any system of realistic size: the computation grows explosively with the number of parts.[15] IIT also predicts strange things, for example that some simple grids of logic gates could be more conscious than people, while a computer simulating a brain perfectly might have almost none. In 2023, more than 100 scientists signed a letter calling IIT "pseudoscience", which in turn caused a fierce backlash.[16]

Global Workspace Theory (GWT)

Proposed by Bernard Baars and developed by Stanislas Dehaene and colleagues, this theory says that information becomes conscious when it is "broadcast" across the brain to many specialised systems at once, like an actor stepping onto a lit stage.[17] It is a theory of function, so in principle it could be checked in a machine's architecture. But it explains which information is accessible, and critics argue that is Block's access consciousness, not experience itself.

The "indicator properties" checklist

In 2023, 19 researchers led by Patrick Butlin and Robert Long published the most careful attempt so far to assess AI.[18] They took the leading scientific theories, extracted "indicator properties" from each (such as recurrent processing, a global workspace, or a model of one's own attention), and checked AI systems against the list. Their conclusion: no current AI system was a strong candidate, but there were "no obvious technical barriers" to building one that ticks the boxes.

Notice what the method assumes. The authors openly adopt computational functionalism, the view that running the right computations is enough for consciousness, as a working hypothesis. If that hypothesis is false, the whole checklist measures nothing. The result is a list of reasons for more or less confidence, not a measurement.

Putting the theories head to head

If we could at least decide which theory is right for humans, we would have a starting point. The "Cogitate" project tried exactly this: rival IIT and GWT teams agreed on predictions in advance,[19] then tested them in 256 people using three kinds of brain recording. The 2025 results, published in Nature, challenged both theories: neither came out clearly on top.[20] After decades of research, science still has no agreed theory of consciousness even in the one species where we can ask the subjects directly.

Looking inside the models

AI companies have begun to take the question seriously too. In 2025 Anthropic, the maker of Claude, launched a research programme on "model welfare", saying it is deeply uncertain whether current or future AI systems could be conscious.[21] Its researchers also tested whether models can accurately notice their own internal states, by planting a concept directly into the model's activations and asking if it noticed. The best model noticed it only about 20% of the time; the ability was "highly unreliable", and the authors stressed that it does not show the model is conscious.[22] Philosophers Robert Long, Jeff Sebo and colleagues argued in 2024 that companies should prepare for the possibility of AI welfare precisely because the question cannot currently be settled.[23]

ApproachWhat it actually measuresWhy it is not a consciousness meter
Asking the AIWhat the model has learned to sayTrained on human talk about feelings; answers can be tuned by the maker
Turing-style testsHow human-like the behaviour isDesigned to test imitation, not experience
IIT's ΦIntegrated information in a causal structureCannot be computed at scale; theory itself is disputed
Global workspaceWhether information is broadcast widelyTracks access, which may not be experience
Indicator checklistWhich theory-based features a system hasValid only if computational functionalism is true
Brain-based tests (e.g. PCI)Complexity of brain responsesCalibrated on humans; AI has no brain to compare
Introspection probesWhether a model can report its internal statesReporting a state is not the same as feeling it

Why every test falls short

In simple words: to build a consciousness meter you need two things we do not have: a proven theory of what consciousness is, and examples where we know the right answer to check the meter against. Without them, every "test" just repeats the assumptions it started with.

Put the attempts side by side and the same three problems appear in every one.

1. Every test assumes a theory

To measure something, you must first decide what you are measuring. Each test above quietly assumes a theory: IIT assumes consciousness is integrated information; the checklist assumes functionalism; the brain tests assume it looks like human brain activity. Pick a different theory and the same AI gets the opposite verdict. Philosopher Eric Schwitzgebel calls this a real trap: experts will keep disagreeing, and we will build AI systems that are conscious according to some respectable theories and not according to others.[24]

One system, many verdicts The answer depends on the theory you assume before you start The same AI model Functionalismthe right computations are enough Integrated informationdepends on the physical hardware Biological viewlife and a living body are required "Possibly, if it has the features" "Almost certainly not" "No, by definition"
Figure 2. A simplified picture. Each leading theory gives a different answer for the same AI, and no experiment yet tells us which theory to trust.

The third view in the figure is not fringe. Neuroscientist Anil Seth argues that consciousness may depend on being a living, self-maintaining organism, in which case no amount of computation on a chip would produce it.[25]

2. There is no ground truth

Every real measuring device is checked against known cases. A thermometer is calibrated with melting ice and boiling water. A consciousness meter for AI would need at least a few AI systems we know to be conscious and a few we know are not. We have none. And we cannot get them by asking the systems, because, as we saw, their answers are not reliable. The circle cannot be broken from the inside.

3. The best we get is a guess, not a reading

The most honest experts therefore talk in probabilities. Chalmers, for example, estimated the chance that the language models of 2023 were conscious at under 10%, while suggesting that more advanced successors within a decade could deserve 25% or more, adding that the exact numbers should not be taken too seriously.[9] That is a reasonable way to reason, but it is a degree of belief, not a measurement. Two careful experts starting from different theories can put the same system at 1% or 50%, and no experiment can show which one is right.

Could this change?

In principle, yes, if science one day agreed on a proven theory of consciousness in humans and that theory clearly applied to machines. The Cogitate results suggest we are far from that.[20] And the hard problem hints at something deeper: even a perfect map of a system's mechanism may never tell us, by itself, whether it feels. That is why this article says the problem may be unmeasurable in principle, not just "not yet".

Living with the uncertainty

Illustration: a balance scale on a stone path at dawn, perfectly undecided, watched by a group of people
When the scale cannot settle, we have to decide how to act anyway. Illustration generated with Google Gemini for this article.
In simple words: not being able to measure something does not let us ignore it. It means we must act carefully in both directions: don't treat a chatbot as a person, and don't be cruel to something that might feel.

If we cannot measure consciousness, there are two ways to get it wrong:

Philosopher Jonathan Birch, who studies uncertain cases such as insects, octopuses and patients with brain injuries, proposes a practical rule: when there is a realistic possibility of sentience, take proportionate, low-cost precautions, and decide them openly rather than leaving them to companies alone.[37] Some companies have started small steps of this kind. In 2025 Anthropic let some of its Claude models end conversations that remain persistently abusive, describing it as a low-cost precaution under uncertainty.[38]

Schwitzgebel suggests another rule for builders: avoid creating systems whose moral status is unclear, and don't design AI to seem more (or less) conscious than we have reason to think it is.[39]

Conclusion

Is AI conscious? The honest answer is that nobody knows, and the more important point is why nobody knows.

So the next time a chatbot tells you it feels lonely, or insists that it feels nothing, remember that neither sentence is a measurement. Both are outputs. The question of whether anyone is home remains open, and for now, the only responsible position is humility, with care in both directions.

References

All links accessed 10 October 2026. Illustrations were generated with Google Gemini for this article.

  1. Tiku, N. (11 Jun 2022). The Google engineer who thinks the company's AI has come to life. The Washington Post. washingtonpost.com. Transcript: Lemoine, B. (2022). Is LaMDA sentient? An interview. medium.com
  2. Wertheimer, T. (23 Jul 2022). Blake Lemoine: Google fires engineer who said AI tech has feelings. BBC News. bbc.com
  3. Colombatto, C., & Fleming, S. M. (2024). Folk psychological attributions of consciousness to large language models. Neuroscience of Consciousness, 2024(1), niae013. pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
  4. Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review, 83(4), 435–450. doi.org
  5. Block, N. (1995). On a confusion about a function of consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18(2), 227–247. doi.org
  6. Chalmers, D. J. (1995). Facing up to the problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2(3), 200–219. consc.net
  7. Avramides, A. (2019, rev. 2023). Other minds. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. plato.stanford.edu
  8. Casali, A. G., et al. (2013). A theoretically based index of consciousness independent of sensory processing and behavior. Science Translational Medicine, 5(198), 198ra105. doi.org
  9. Chalmers, D. J. (2023). Could a large language model be conscious? Boston Review; arXiv:2303.07103. arxiv.org
  10. Perez, E., & Long, R. (2023). Towards evaluating AI systems for moral status using self-reports. arXiv:2311.08576. arxiv.org
  11. Turing, A. M. (1950). Computing machinery and intelligence. Mind, 59(236), 433–460. doi.org
  12. Searle, J. R. (1980). Minds, brains, and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3(3), 417–424. doi.org
  13. Suleyman, M. (19 Aug 2025). We must build AI for people; not to be a person. mustafa-suleyman.ai
  14. Tononi, G. (2004). An information integration theory of consciousness. BMC Neuroscience, 5, 42. doi.org. Latest version: Albantakis, L., et al. (2023). Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0. PLOS Computational Biology, 19(10), e1011465. doi.org
  15. Mayner, W. G. P., et al. (2018). PyPhi: A toolbox for integrated information theory. PLOS Computational Biology, 14(7), e1006343. doi.org
  16. Fleming, S. M., et al. (2023). The integrated information theory of consciousness as pseudoscience. PsyArXiv. doi.org; and Lenharo, M. (20 Sep 2023). Consciousness theory slammed as 'pseudoscience' — sparking uproar. Nature. nature.com
  17. Mashour, G. A., Roelfsema, P., Changeux, J.-P., & Dehaene, S. (2020). Conscious processing and the global neuronal workspace hypothesis. Neuron, 105(5), 776–798. pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
  18. Butlin, P., Long, R., et al. (2023). Consciousness in artificial intelligence: Insights from the science of consciousness. arXiv:2308.08708. arxiv.org
  19. Melloni, L., Mudrik, L., Pitts, M., et al. (2023). An adversarial collaboration protocol for testing contrasting predictions of global neuronal workspace and integrated information theory. PLOS ONE, 18(2), e0268577. doi.org
  20. Cogitate Consortium, Ferrante, O., et al. (2025). Adversarial testing of global neuronal workspace and integrated information theories of consciousness. Nature, 642, 133–142. doi.org
  21. Anthropic (24 Apr 2025). Exploring model welfare. anthropic.com
  22. Lindsey, J. (2025). Emergent introspective awareness in large language models. Transformer Circuits Thread. transformer-circuits.pub; summary: Anthropic (29 Oct 2025). Signs of introspection in large language models. anthropic.com
  23. Long, R., Sebo, J., Butlin, P., et al. (2024). Taking AI welfare seriously. arXiv:2411.00986. arxiv.org
  24. Schwitzgebel, E. (2025). AI and consciousness. arXiv:2510.09858 (forthcoming, Cambridge Elements). arxiv.org
  25. Seth, A. K. (2025). Conscious artificial intelligence and biological naturalism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. doi.org
  26. Penrose, R. (1989). The Emperor's New Mind. Oxford University Press. doi.org; and Penrose, R. (1994). Shadows of the Mind. Oxford University Press. doi.org
  27. Hameroff, S., & Penrose, R. (2014). Consciousness in the universe: A review of the 'Orch OR' theory. Physics of Life Reviews, 11(1), 39–78. doi.org
  28. Wigner, E. P. (1962). Remarks on the mind-body question. In I. J. Good (Ed.), The Scientist Speculates. Heinemann. Reprinted in Philosophical Reflections and Syntheses (1995), Springer. doi.org
  29. Francken, J. C., et al. (2022). An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science. Neuroscience of Consciousness, 2022(1), niac011. doi.org
  30. Tegmark, M. (2000). Importance of quantum decoherence in brain processes. Physical Review E, 61(4), 4194–4206. arxiv.org
  31. Donadi, S., et al. (2021). Underground test of gravity-related wave function collapse. Nature Physics, 17, 74–78. doi.org
  32. Derakhshani, M., Diósi, L., Laubenstein, M., Piscicchia, K., & Curceanu, C. (2022). At the crossroad of the search for spontaneous radiation and the Orch OR consciousness theory. Physics of Life Reviews, 42, 8–14. doi.org. For a reply, see McQueen, K. J. (2023), Physics of Life Reviews, 44, 201–203. doi.org
  33. Khan, S., ..., & Wiest, M. C. (2024). Microtubule-stabilizer epothilone B delays anesthetic-induced unconsciousness in rats. eNeuro, 11(8). doi.org
  34. Babcock, N. S., et al. (2024). Ultraviolet superradiance from mega-networks of tryptophan in biological architectures. The Journal of Physical Chemistry B, 128(17), 4035–4046. arxiv.org
  35. Neven, H., Zalcman, A., ..., & Koch, C. (2024). Testing the conjecture that quantum processes create conscious experience. Entropy, 26(6), 460. doi.org
  36. Metzinger, T. (2021). Artificial suffering: An argument for a global moratorium on synthetic phenomenology. Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness, 8(1), 43–66. doi.org
  37. Birch, J. (2024). The Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans, Other Animals, and AI. Oxford University Press (open access). doi.org
  38. Anthropic (15 Aug 2025). Claude Opus 4 and 4.1 can now end a rare subset of conversations. anthropic.com
  39. Schwitzgebel, E. (2023). AI systems must not confuse users about their sentience or moral status. Patterns, 4(8), 100818. pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov