Introduction Older than ChatGPT What AI added: three multipliers What the studies found Where it shows up Crutch or scaffold? Tests that expose the illusion Conclusion References

The Illusion of Knowing in the Age of AI

The output is on the screen and it is good. The knowledge is not in the head. And the person usually does not know it. Why AI makes us feel we understand, and four ways to check

Dr. Abedal-Kareem Al-Banna · October 2026 · 19 references

Beginner ~10 min read

Table of Contents

Introduction: two desks, one problem Older than ChatGPT What AI added: three multipliers What the studies found Where it shows up Crutch or scaffold? Tests that expose the illusion Conclusion References

Introduction: two desks, one problem

Illustration: a person looks confidently into a mirror; in the reflection the inside of their head is fog with small question marks, while the laptop on the desk shows a perfectly tidy page
The page on the screen is tidy. The understanding behind it is fog. The mirror is the only honest instrument in the room. Illustration generated with Google Gemini for this article.

A manager asks an AI assistant for a strategy memo, reads it twice, finds nothing wrong, and signs it. In the meeting, the first question is "why this option and not the other?" There is a pause that lasts a little too long.

Across town, a student submits a Deep Learning project. The model trains, the accuracy is excellent, the code is clean. Then the examiner asks why that learning rate, and what would happen if the BatchNorm layers were removed. The project works. The answer does not come.

Same phenomenon, different desks. In both cases the output is present and the knowledge is absent, and in both cases the person did not know it until someone asked. That last part is the definition of an illusion: you cannot see it from the inside.

The greatest danger is not that people will not know. It is that they will not know while feeling that they do.
An old Arabic verse puts the two cases side by side: "If you knew, that is a calamity; and if you did not know, the calamity is greater."

This article makes one argument in three steps. The illusion is old and well documented. AI did not invent it; it multiplied it, in three specific ways. And it can be caught, by anyone, with a few cheap tests.

Older than ChatGPT

Illustration: two hands pull a large zipper; where the teeth meet, the mechanism dissolves into clouds and tiny drifting gears
Everyone can use a zipper. Ask them to explain, tooth by tooth, how it holds, and the confidence goes with the clouds. Illustration generated with Google Gemini for this article.

In 2002, Leonid Rozenblit and Frank Keil at Yale asked people how well they understood everyday objects: a zipper, a flush toilet, a bicycle, a sewing machine. People rated themselves generously. Then they were asked to write out, step by step, how the thing actually works. The ratings collapsed. Rozenblit and Keil named the gap the illusion of explanatory depth: we feel we understand complex things with far more precision and depth than we really do, and the feeling is strongest for exactly the kind of knowledge, mechanisms and causes, that matters most.[1]

The mechanism behind it is simple. We confuse familiarity with understanding. I have seen a zipper ten thousand times, so my brain files it as known. Familiarity is a feeling. Understanding is the ability to reconstruct, predict and repair. They are not the same thing, and the feeling arrives first.

Nine years later Betsy Sparrow, Jenny Liu and Daniel Wegner showed what happens when information is always one search away. People who expected to be able to look something up later remembered the information less, and remembered where to find it more. They called it the Google effect: the search engine becomes part of our memory, and we quietly reassign what we keep in our heads.[2]

Worse, the search does not just move knowledge out of the head; it makes us believe more of it is in there. Across nine experiments, Matthew Fisher, Mariel Goddu and Frank Keil found that searching the internet for explanations raised people's estimates of their own internal knowledge, including on unrelated questions they had never searched.[3] Adrian Ward later showed the same inflation with a neat twist: people who could google a quiz rated their own memory and intelligence higher, and predicted they would do better on a future quiz without the internet. The process is so fast and seamless that we forget we used it.[4]

In simple words: we have always mistaken "I have seen it" for "I understand it", and "I can find it" for "I know it". Both mistakes were measured in the laboratory long before anyone typed a prompt.

What AI added: three multipliers

A search engine gives you a page and leaves you to read it. A language model gives you an answer, written in confident prose, in your own words if you ask, in seconds. That difference feeds three mechanisms at once.

Illustration: a perfectly smooth polished sphere in warm light; its shadow on the ground is full of cracks and missing pieces
Fluency is the polish on the surface. The cracks are in the shadow, where the reader rarely looks. Illustration generated with Google Gemini for this article.

1. Fluency reads as truth

Psychologists call it processing fluency: the easier something is to read, hear or picture, the more true, likeable and familiar it feels. The effect has been found with clearer fonts, rhyming slogans, repeated statements and simpler words.[5] Daniel Oppenheimer showed that writers who used needlessly long words were judged less intelligent, because their text was harder to process.[6] Now reverse it. A model produces text that is smooth, well structured and free of hesitation. Our brain uses ease of processing as a signal of understanding, so a fluent answer feels both correct and understood. The polish is on the surface; the signal we read is the surface.

2. False ownership

When the model writes a paragraph or a function under my name and I read it and nod, I feel I produced it. But recognising something is not generating it. In 1978 Norman Slamecka and Peter Graf showed that words people generate themselves are remembered far better than the same words simply read; the generation effect is one of the most replicated findings in memory research.[7] Reading an answer the model generated gives me the memory of a reader, not of an author, while leaving me with the author's confidence.

3. No friction

Understanding is built from productive struggle: the attempt, the error, the correction. Robert and Elizabeth Bjork call the conditions that make learning feel harder but stick better desirable difficulties: spacing, testing yourself, generating answers before seeing them.[8] Students who explain worked examples to themselves, step by step, learn to solve new problems; students who just read them do not.[9] AI removes the friction. It also removes the learning that the friction was doing. And because the people with the least skill are the least able to see what they are missing, the gap stays invisible to the one person who most needs to see it.[10]

What the studies found

These are not only laboratory worries. Four recent studies, from four different fields, point the same way.

Lisa Messeri and Molly Crockett put the risk for science in one sentence: AI tools promise to let us produce more while understanding less, by exploiting exactly the cognitive shortcuts above.[15] A 2025 survey of 666 people across ages found the same pattern in everyday life: heavier use of AI tools went with more "cognitive offloading" and lower critical-thinking scores, most strongly in the young.[16]

Where it shows up

The illusion does not belong to students or programmers. It belongs to anyone who accepts output in place of understanding. Eight desks, one tell: the output is present, the knowledge is absent, and the person does not know it.

The Deep Learning studentThe project trains and scores well. Asked why this learning rate, or what breaks without BatchNorm, there is silence. The code is an answer to a question the student never asked.Tell: cannot change one setting and predict the result.
The programmerThe generated function reads cleanly and passes the tests. The programmer could read it, but could not have written it, and does not notice the difference until the first bug the tests did not cover.Tell: can review, cannot rewrite from scratch.
The researcherThe literature review arrives summarised, with themes and gaps already named. The papers were never opened. The field now looks tidier than it is, and the gap the summary missed is the one the study will fall into.[15]Tell: can name the papers, cannot say what any of them measured.
The lawyerIn 2023 two New York lawyers filed a brief whose cases, quotes and citations had been invented by a chatbot; the court sanctioned them. The brief read like a brief. Nobody opened a reporter.[17]Tell: fluent citations nobody has read.
The managerThe strategy memo is coherent, balanced and signed. The first "why not the alternative?" in the meeting finds no owner, because the trade-off was never weighed by anyone in the room.Tell: can present the decision, cannot defend it.
The clinicianAn AI summary of a guideline replaces the guideline. The summary is right about the common case and silent about the exception, and the exception is the patient in the chair.Tell: knows the recommendation, not its conditions.
The journalistThe draft is fluent, structured and on deadline. Its one unverified fact is the one that gets quoted, because fluent text is the hardest to doubt.Tell: polished prose, unchecked claims.
The teacherThe essays are suddenly polished. Grading the product says nothing about what was learned; only the conversation afterwards does, and the timetable has no slot for it.Tell: grades the output, never hears the student explain it.

Notice that none of these people is lazy or careless. Each did what used to be enough: read the output, found it plausible, moved on. What changed is that plausible output is now free, and understanding is still expensive.

Crutch or scaffold?

Illustration, split scene: on the left a person leans their whole weight on a crutch shaped like a glowing device, one leg faded; on the right a person stands straight beside a half-built wall surrounded by scaffolding, building it with their own hands
The crutch carries the weight for you, and the muscle wastes. The scaffold holds you up while you build, and then it comes down. Illustration generated with Google Gemini for this article.

Two pictures separate the healthy use from the harmful one.

A crutch carries the load instead of you. It is wonderful for a broken leg. Lean on it when the leg is healthy and the muscle wastes, quietly, until one day the crutch is missing and you discover you cannot stand.

A scaffold supports you temporarily while you build something you could not yet build alone, and then it is removed. The word comes from education: David Wood, Jerome Bruner and Gail Ross used it in 1976 for the way a tutor holds the parts of a task the learner cannot yet manage, and hands them back one by one.[18] The whole point of a scaffold is that it is designed to disappear.

Crutch Scaffold time with the tool carrying the load the muscle wastes; without the tool, no standing support is withdrawn as the wall rises the wall stands alone; the scaffold was meant to go
Figure 1. The same tool, two postures. A crutch carries the load and the capacity fades. A scaffold supports a capacity while it grows, and is removed on purpose.

Gavriel Salomon and colleagues drew the line thirty-five years ago, before any of today's tools existed: there are effects with a technology, what you can do while it is in your hands, and effects of it, what you can do afterwards, without it. Both depend on whether the person stays mindfully engaged, and the second is the one that counts as learning.[19]

The rule: the problem is never the tool. It is the posture. The same assistant is a crutch for the person who accepts its answer and a scaffold for the person who predicts first, compares, and takes the next step alone.

Tests that expose the illusion

Illustration: a person at a whiteboard explains a diagram of shapes and arrows to a seated colleague; the laptop on the table is closed
The whiteboard test. If you can explain it with the laptop closed, you know it. If you cannot, you have found the fog before it found you. Illustration generated with Google Gemini for this article.

The illusion cannot be seen from the inside, so the tests have to come from outside the feeling. Rozenblit and Keil's own method is the first one: the moment people had to write the explanation out, the illusion broke.[1] Four tests, each a few minutes, each usable by anyone at any desk:

TestHowWhat it catches
Explain it without the toolClose the laptop. Explain the answer to a colleague at a whiteboard, or write it in your own words from memory.Familiarity posing as understanding. The explanation stops exactly where the knowledge stops.
Predict before you askBefore sending the prompt, write what you expect the answer, or the error, to be. Then compare.False ownership. A prediction is something you generated; a match or a miss is something you learn from. Reading the answer first gives you neither.
Change one conditionAlter one assumption in the problem: a different data size, a different client, a different deadline. Say what changes in the answer before you ask.Output without a model behind it. If you cannot say what moves, you did not understand what held it in place.
Teach itExplain the idea to someone who will ask "why?" twice.The second "why" is where the fog lives.

For teachers, examiners and managers, the same four tests become a way of assessing people rather than outputs: a short oral follow-up on any submitted work; marks for the process (the predictions, the attempts, the corrections) and not only the product; "what if" questions that move one condition; and asking for the prediction before the tool is opened. None of these bans the tool. All of them make it a scaffold.

The five-minute check: next time an AI gives you something you are about to use, say it back without looking, change one condition, and ask yourself what you would have answered before you asked. If all three go well, the knowledge is yours. If not, you have just saved yourself from the meeting, the exam or the courtroom where someone else would have found out.

Conclusion

The illusion of explanatory depth is twenty years old; the Google effect is fifteen. AI did not create the illusion of knowing. It made fluent, confident, personalised output free, and left understanding at its old price. Three mechanisms do the damage: fluency that reads as truth, recognition that feels like authorship, and the removal of the friction that learning was made of. The 2023 to 2025 studies, in consulting, classrooms, offices and laboratories, all show the same shape: better output, worse understanding, and no alarm.

The danger is not ignorance. Conscious ignorance is the engine of learning; it asks questions. The danger is ignorance dressed in fluency, because it stops asking. Keep the tool. Change the posture: predict before you ask, explain with the laptop closed, change one condition, and let the scaffold come down.

References

All links accessed 19 October 2026. Illustrations were generated with Google Gemini for this article.

  1. Rozenblit, L. and Keil, F. (2002). The misunderstood limits of folk science: an illusion of explanatory depth. Cognitive Science, 26(5), 521–562. doi.org
  2. Sparrow, B., Liu, J. and Wegner, D. M. (2011). Google effects on memory: cognitive consequences of having information at our fingertips. Science, 333(6043), 776–778. doi.org
  3. Fisher, M., Goddu, M. K. and Keil, F. C. (2015). Searching for explanations: how the Internet inflates estimates of internal knowledge. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 144(3), 674–687. doi.org
  4. Ward, A. F. (2021). People mistake the internet's knowledge for their own. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 118(43), e2105061118. doi.org
  5. Alter, A. L. and Oppenheimer, D. M. (2009). Uniting the tribes of fluency to form a metacognitive nation. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 13(3), 219–235. doi.org
  6. Oppenheimer, D. M. (2006). Consequences of erudite vernacular utilized irrespective of necessity: problems with using long words needlessly. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 20(2), 139–156. doi.org
  7. Slamecka, N. J. and Graf, P. (1978). The generation effect: delineation of a phenomenon. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 4(6), 592–604. doi.org
  8. Bjork, E. L. and Bjork, R. A. (2011). Making things hard on yourself, but in a good way: creating desirable difficulties to enhance learning. In Psychology and the Real World (pp. 56–64). Worth Publishers. bjorklab.psych.ucla.edu
  9. Chi, M. T. H., Bassok, M., Lewis, M. W., Reimann, P. and Glaser, R. (1989). Self-explanations: how students study and use examples in learning to solve problems. Cognitive Science, 13(2), 145–182. doi.org
  10. Kruger, J. and Dunning, D. (1999). Unskilled and unaware of it: how difficulties in recognizing one's own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77(6), 1121–1134. doi.org
  11. Dell'Acqua, F., McFowland, E., Mollick, E., Lifshitz-Assaf, H., Kellogg, K., Rajendran, S., Krayer, L., Candelon, F. and Lakhani, K. R. (2023). Navigating the jagged technological frontier: field experimental evidence of the effects of AI on knowledge worker productivity and quality. Harvard Business School Working Paper 24-013. hbs.edu
  12. Bastani, H., Bastani, O., Sungu, A., Ge, H., Kabakcı, Ö. and Mariman, R. (2025). Generative AI without guardrails can harm learning: evidence from high school mathematics. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 122(26), e2422633122. doi.org
  13. Lee, H.-P., Sarkar, A., Tankelevitch, L., Drosos, I., Rintel, S., Banks, R. and Wilson, N. (2025). The impact of generative AI on critical thinking: self-reported reductions in cognitive effort and confidence effects from a survey of knowledge workers. CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI '25). doi.org
  14. Kosmyna, N., Hauptmann, E., Yuan, Y. T. et al. (2025). Your brain on ChatGPT: accumulation of cognitive debt when using an AI assistant for essay writing task. arXiv:2506.08872. arxiv.org
  15. Messeri, L. and Crockett, M. J. (2024). Artificial intelligence and illusions of understanding in scientific research. Nature, 627, 49–58. doi.org
  16. Gerlich, M. (2025). AI tools in society: impacts on cognitive offloading and the future of critical thinking. Societies, 15(1), 6. doi.org
  17. Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2023), opinion and order on sanctions, 22 June 2023 (Castel, J.). Docket 1:22-cv-01461, document 54. docketalarm.com
  18. Wood, D., Bruner, J. S. and Ross, G. (1976). The role of tutoring in problem solving. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 17(2), 89–100. doi.org
  19. Salomon, G., Perkins, D. N. and Globerson, T. (1991). Partners in cognition: extending human intelligence with intelligent technologies. Educational Researcher, 20(3), 2–9. doi.org